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12Abstract
13This article’s guiding thesis is that the theory of radical democratic citizenship is built on a
14tension between a radical, conflictual element and a democratic element. As radical
15democrats, these philosophers point to the intimate relation between conflict and both
16emancipation and democracy. But as radical democrats, they also propose different
17methods that prevent conflict from breaking up the polis—the common ground that
18makes democratic conflict possible. I look at two radical democrats’ way of dealing with
19this tension: Chantal Mouffe and Étienne Balibar. My claim is that the former ends up
20overemphasising the danger of division in her later democratic works and is therefore
21unable to account for more intense forms of democratic resistance (such as riots). In the
22work of Balibar, however, we find a way of dealing with this tension.




27We are living in an age of riots and urban revolts. As Mustafa Dikeç recounts, in 2001,
28Cincinnati erupted into riots of an order not seen since the 1992 Los Angeles riots; in 2005,
29France saw a string of riots on a scale not seen since 1968; Greece (2008), London (2011),
30Stockholm (2013) and Istanbul (2013) followed; and most recently, the cities of Baltimore
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31(2015), Milwaukee and Charlotte (2016) did as well (Dikeç 2017, p. 1). These riots, Dikeç
32argues, speak to the failure of liberal democracies—to the tension between the ideals of
33equality and liberty that they uphold and the empirical realities of inequality that give rise to
34these forms of revolt (ibid., p. 218). As the institution of liberal democratic citizenship is being
35hollowed out, new figures of citizenship emerge.
36This paper is not mainly concerned with the specificities of this age of riots. What I am
37interested in is how democratic theory could respond to the emergence of this rioter-citizen.What
38got me started on this piece are two conflicting politico-philosophical interpretations of the
39French riots. On the one hand, the French philosopher Étienne Balibar wrote an essay in the
40wake of these riots in which he carefully examined the conflicting tendencies at the heart of these
41riots. A riot, he argued, is characterised by political and anti-political elements. It is up to activists
42and political thinkers to understand the riot and reinforce its political tendencies (Balibar 2014,
43pp. 231–258). The Belgian philosopher Chantal Mouffe, on the other hand, restricted herself to a
44few disapproving paragraphs. Riots, she wrote, are a blind form of violence that erupts in
45response to a crisis of political representation (Mouffe 2013, pp. 121–122).
46I propose to connect these judgements to the philosophical positions that produce them.
47What is striking, then, is that both authors work in a similar philosophical tradition: that of
48radical democratic theory. In other words, here are two prominent thinkers who attach great
49importance to political conflict. According to them, conflict is of central importance to a
50democracy. I would suggest, then, that their different views on riots derive from a tension
51within this radical democratic thinking.
52On the one hand, conflict is the very soul of a radical democracy. Against the tendency to
53neutralise political problems with technocratic means, the radical democrat argues that without
54political conflict, there is no democracy. On the other hand, the radical democrat is also a democrat,
55and this implies that she sees the need for a shared and stable political space. After all, if political
56conflicts escalate, it will be harder for citizens to see their opponents as co-citizens. Radical
57democrats are thus well aware of the dangers of a civil war—a conflict in which shared rules of
58engagement lose their value and citizens can no longer see each other as political opponents. The
59result is a circulation of violence and the impossibility of (democratic) politics (Traverso 2017, pp.
6064–100). Radical democracy is haunted by this danger and is therefore compelled to install some
61provisos. They limit the conflict that they value to prevent its escalation.
62I will argue that this latter precautionary principle can turn against the central insights of
63radical democratic theory. In Mouffe’s later works on agonistic democracy, we will see that her
64(Schmittian) concern with the escalation of violence turns against her earlier, radical demo-
65cratic insights into the value and necessity of political conflict. This leads her to denounce
66more radical or violent forms of conflict such as riots or revolts. Having demonstrated this, I
67will turn to the work of Balibar. In his writings on civility and violence, we find a way to hold
68on to the insights of the radical democratic tradition without necessarily ignoring or belittling
69Mouffe’s legitimate concerns with violence.
70Chantal Mouffe: the Threat of the Untamed Conflict
71Chantal Mouffe’s name is inextricably connected to the notion of democratic conflict. Her
72position in the politico-philosophical landscape is tied to her claim that most social and
73political philosophies either suppress or ignore conflict. Her own theories of radical and
74agonistic democracy, on the other hand, leave ample room for political conflict.
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75However, her notion of political conflict and justification for the importance of a certain
76kind of conflict are subject to subtle yet important changes. Before we can criticise her theory,
77we must show how the relation between conflict and democracy evolves throughout her work.
78Laclau and Mouffe: Antagonism, Hegemony and Radical Democracy
79The first formulation of this relation can be found in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (co-
80authored with Ernesto Laclau) (Laclau and Mouffe 2014 [1985]). This volume is conceived as
81an attempt to apply insights garnered from anti-essentialist traditions (such as structuralist and
82post-structuralist linguistics) to the study of politics and society. The first axiom of their
83approach is that there is no such thing as society as an objective ‘thing-in-itself’. Social
84entities and the relations among them can only become accessible for us through an act of
85discursive articulation. More precisely, they argue that social objects do not have an objective
86essence but can only appear to the extent that they are articulated in relation to other objects
87(ibid., pp. 92–93). In turn, this structuralist framework is subjected to Derrida’s critique:
88discursive articulation is not only necessary, but also—and paradoxically—impossible. A
89discursive articulation among different elements can never become a closed system as ‘all
90discourse is subverted by a field of discursivity which overflows it’ (ibid., pp. 98–99). Even if
91society can only appear discursively, our attempts at discursive articulation will never be
92completely successful.
93Laclau and Mouffe appropriate two concepts to carry out the translation to social
94theory: ‘antagonism’ and ‘hegemony’. The concept of antagonism stands for the idea
95that negativity is constitutive of society and can never be overcome (Mouffe 2013, p.
96130). In their own words: antagonism ‘is a relation wherein the limits of every objec-
97tivity are shown’ and therefore antagonisms constitute the limit of society, the latter’s
98impossibility of fully constituting itself (Laclau and Mouffe 2014 [1985], p. 112).
99Hegemony, in turn, functions as the constructive element of their theory. The impossi-
100bility of society—its lack of an ultimate organising principle—is not the endpoint of this
101theory. They recognise the need to create some form of order (ibid., pp. 112, 115). This
102is where the concept of hegemony comes in: it is through hegemonic practices that a
103(contingent) social order comes into being. What this entails is that there is no such thing
104as a social order that is not political. The constitution of social objectivity is an act of
105power that excludes (Mouffe 2005, p. 17). After all, if order is created in a context of
106indeterminacy, it necessarily forecloses other possible articulations of social objectivity
107(Mouffe 2013, p. 131).
108It is on this terrain that Laclau and Mouffe construct their theory of radical democracy. It is
109an attempt to carry on the Marxist concern with emancipation—the struggle against inequal-
110ities and relations of subordination—in a world that is at odds with the premises of classical
111Marxist theory. First of all, it is no longer possible to assume the ontologically privileged
112position of the proletariat. On the contrary, ‘there are a variety of possible antagonisms in the
113social, many of them in opposition to each other’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2014 [1985], p. 117).
114Not only does the anti-essentialist framework call into question the social-scientific concept of
115‘class struggles’. We have also arrived at a moment in history in which many new antagonisms
116(e.g. ecological, feminist, anti-institutional, anti-racist) proliferate (ibid., pp. 143–155). Second,
117to the extent that antagonism and hegemony are constitutive of social reality, it is no longer
118possible to hold onto a view of communist society as ‘a transparent society from which
119antagonisms have disappeared’ (ibid., p. xxiv).
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120Therefore, the project of emancipation will have to be waged on different terms. In the first
121place, Laclau and Mouffe no longer assume that relations of subordination automatically give
122rise to struggles against it. After all, certain relations of subordination—in which one agent is
123subjected to the decisions of another—are perfectly ‘natural’ within particular discursive
124formations. As long as women are seen as naturally subordinate to men, the relations of
125subordination between men and women cannot yet become a site of antagonism. It is only ‘in
126the terms of a different discursive formation, such as ‘the rights inherent to every human
127being’, that the differential positivity of these categories can be subverted and the subordina-
128tion constructed as oppression’ (ibid., p. 138).
129This brings us to a second important element: modern emancipatory struggles only become
130possible as a result of the democratic revolution once the democratic principles of liberty and
131equality have imposed themselves ‘as the new matrix of the social imaginary’ (ibid.). Hence, in
132contrast to classical Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe accept the principles of liberty and equality
133as the horizon of modern emancipatory struggles (Decreus and Lievens 2011, p. 691).
134The final element concerns the matter of the new antagonisms. As the principles of liberty
135and equality constitute the matrix of our social imaginary, different relations of subordination
136can become constructed as forms of oppression. As Mouffe argues, ‘social relations, hitherto
137considered apolitical […] become loci of conflict and antagonism’ (1993, p. 77). And as there
138is no longer a primary antagonism, emancipatory politics has to be able to incorporate different
139democratic struggles. This is what Mouffe and Laclau call the project of radical democracy: an
140attempt to establish a ‘chain of equivalence’ among the different democratic struggles that
141traverse society. Concretely, the goal is to create a reciprocal identification among these
142different struggles through an articulation (in terms of a hegemonic interpretation of the
143democratic principles) of their mutual antagonism to oppressive forces (ibid., pp. 77–78). If
144this process is successful, the democratic principles can be deepened and expanded (Laclau
145and Mouffe 2014 [1985], p. 160).
146Mouffe and the Critique of Normative Liberalism I: Agonistic Democracy and Radical
147Pluralism
148Whereas the concept of antagonism is initially employed in this deconstruction of the Marxist
149project, we see a shift in Mouffe’s later works on agonistic democracy. A first aspect of this
150shift is that the post-structuralist concept of antagonism is supplemented with a notion
151informed by the work of Carl Schmitt. A second aspect of this shift is that the object of her
152critique is no longer classical Marxism, but the normative liberal theories of John Rawls and
153Jürgen Habermas, on the one hand, and the technocratic discourse of post-politics, on the
154other. A third and final aspect is the integration of radical democracy into the theory of
155agonistic democracy. More precisely, the latter is an analytical theory of democracy that
156accounts for the centrality of antagonism and hegemony in democratic politics. The former
157is an ethico-political project that Mouffe endorses in which the expansion and deepening of the
158democratic principles of equality and liberty is central. However, it is but one of the many
159ways in which the democratic principles can be interpreted in an agonistic democracy (Decreus
160and Lievens 2011, pp. 687–689).
161To start with the first shift, as Oliver Marchart argues, we could say that already in
162Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, two different—though not necessarily incompatible—
163definitions of antagonism are at play. On the one hand, we have a ‘real antagonism’ which
164stands for the impossibility of society. But, on the other hand, they also work with a second
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165concept of ‘symbolic antagonism’. This is the antagonism that accompanies identity formation
166and is a form of symbolic inscription (Marchart 2013, pp. 308–312). Let us return to the
167example of radical democracy: this new identity can only be created insofar as an equivalence
168is created among different democratic struggles. In order for this to happen; however,
169‘something identical’—underlying their reciprocal differences—has to be expressed. And this
170‘something’ is that which makes them stand out from their ‘oppressor’. What makes this aspect
171of identity formation antagonistic is the fact that ‘the other’ (in this case the oppressor)
172becomes both a condition of possibility and impossibility of ‘my’ identity (in this case that
173of the radical democrats) (Wenman 2013b, p. 60).
174Looking back on this shift, Mouffe argues that indeed there are two definitions of
175antagonism at play here. However, she proposes that the category of ‘real antagonism’
176—that indicates the limit of every objectivity—be replaced by that of dislocation.1 Antago-
177nism, on the other hand, is firmly located within the symbolic order—it is the symbolic
178inscription of a dislocation. For example, at one point, a colonial society will fail to fully
179constitute the identities ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’ (i.e. a dislocation). In turn, this enables the
180attempt to inscribe this dislocation in the symbolic order antagonistically. The former ‘the
181colonised’ can now identify anew as ‘liberation fighters’ against the ‘colonial occupiers’. It is
182this latter definition, she argues, that becomes a priority in her later works (Decreus and
183Lievens 2011, p. 682).
184In these later works on agonistic democracy (starting with The Return of the Political), she
185develops this concept of antagonism through an engagement with Carl Schmitt. Here, Mouffe
186contends, we discover ‘the specificity of the political in its dimension of conflict/decision’
187(Mouffe 1993, p. 2). Schmitt’s lesson is twofold: first, he teaches us that in politics we cannot
188do without collective forms of identification in which a ‘we’ is delimited from a ‘them’.
189Therefore, politics does not primarily concern the interactions between individuals, but the
190conflict between collectives. Moreover, a we/them relation can always become a friend/enemy
191relation. This entails that as the ‘enemy’ puts our very existence into question, this relation is
192potentially violent (Mouffe 1993, p. 3; 2005, p. 11). The second lesson is that the decision that
193grounds the friend/enemy distinction is itself without ground. It cannot be justified with
194reference to a universal consensus based on reason (Mouffe 2005, p. 12). As decisions
195concerning the principles of political association cannot represent an impartial standpoint,
196they should be seen for what they are—namely, political decisions (Mouffe 2000, p. 47).
197It is this dimension of antagonism—or, ‘the political’ —that is disavowed in the normative,
198liberal theories of democracy of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. These theories assume that
199a rational consensus concerning essential moral-political principles is the horizon of demo-
200cratic politics. This does not mean that they deny the reality of conflict. On the contrary,
201normative liberal theories are in part a response to the possibility of conflict that accompanies
202modern pluralism. The problem is that they assume that this conflict can be neutralised. They
203believe that it is possible to reach a reasonable agreement on the public principles ordering our
204society and do this by relegating substantive differences in worldviews to the private domain
205(Mouffe 1993, pp. 122–128; 2000, pp. 19–20).
206Mouffe’s own theory of agonistic democracy, on the other hand, tries to incorporate and
207defang this dimension of antagonism. It acknowledges that antagonism is ineradicable, but
208also realises that it is incompatible with a modern pluralist democracy in which citizens should
1 This formulation was initially proposed by Ernesto Laclau in New Reflections on the Revolutions of our Times
(Laclau 1990, pp. 3–89).
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209not see each other as enemies but as political opponents. Therefore, the democratic process
210should be agonistic: it should allow for a conflict between political projects (or,
211collective forms of identification); but the we/them distinction that this conflict entails
212should be relativised. In such an agonistic relation, ‘the conflicting parties, although
213acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recog-
214nize the legitimacy of their opponents’ (Mouffe 2005, p. 20). According to Mouffe,
215this model of agonistic democracy is superior in two ways. On the one hand, it is
216more genuinely pluralistic (i.e. a democratic-normative argument) (see infra). On the
217other, as it does not disavow the logic of antagonism, it is less likely to fall prey to
218its dangers (i.e. an analytical-realist argument) (see the “Mouffe and the Critique of
219Liberalism II: Agonistic Democracy and the Sublimation of Antagonism” section).
220Let us start with the first argument. For the theory of agonistic democracy, Mouffe argues
221that pluralism is an axiological principle: ‘[i]t is taken to be constitutive at the conceptual level
222of the very nature of modern democracy and considered as something that we should celebrate
223and enhance’ (Mouffe 2000, p. 19). The normative liberal theories of Rawls and Habermas, on
224the other hand, pay lip service to the ideal of pluralism but when push comes to shove, they
225shy away from embracing a true plurality of political identities. They can only posit the
226possibility of a rational consensus on the principles of political association by excluding
227conflicts of values from the public sphere.
228The problem with this position, Mouffe argues, is not exclusion per se, but that
229Rawls and Habermas present the exclusion of certain interpretations of the principles
230of political association as justified from an impartial moral standpoint. They do not
231deny that the harmonious political orders that they propose exclude or coerce certain
232political actors, but take it that these forms of coercion and exclusion are stripped of
233their problematic aspects. After all, if the principles that animate a liberal political
234order are the result of a reasonable dialogue, they only exclude those citizens that are
235unreasonable. Thus, if exclusion and coercion are involved, they are perfectly justi-
236fied. Political liberalism, Mouffe argues, makes it look like that problems such as
237exclusion, violence and coercion can be driven out of our societies or, at the least, be
238rationalised (Mouffe 1993, p. 141).
239However, by covering up the political decision at the basis of these liberal orders,
240Rawls and Habermas fail to do justice to the fact that a genuine pluralism entails that
241there is a ‘diversity of ways in which the ‘democratic game’ can be played’ (Mouffe
2422000, p. 73). It is impossible, Mouffe argues, to neatly separate the procedural from the
243substantial. Democratic procedures, that is, already ‘presuppose the acceptance of certain
244values’ (ibid., p. 91). Therefore, we will have to accept that there is no sole rationally
245acceptable way of playing the democratic game. In other words, we can no longer isolate
246the democratic ‘rules of the game’ from contestation (Wenman 2003, p. 62). In turn, this
247is important because if we ‘present the institutions of liberal democracy as the outcome
248of a pure deliberative rationality, [we] reify them and make them impossible to trans-
249form’ (Mouffe 2000, p. 32). If a political regime is seen as the only reasonable
250alternative, then resistance to and critiques of this regime can only be perceived as
251irrational. Yet, if we take the post-structuralist critique of rationalism seriously, then we
252should also accept the likelihood of blind spots in purportedly rational political orders
253(Mouffe 1993, p. 123; 2000, p. 31). In this respect, the liberal normativism is problem-
254atic and not genuinely pluralistic because it forecloses on the possibility of alternative
255interpretations of the principles of liberty and equality.
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256Mouffe and the Critique of Liberalism II: Agonistic Democracy and the Sublimation
257of Antagonism
258In addition to this normative-democratic argument, there is also an analytical-realist critique of
259normative liberalism. This argument goes as follows: the disavowal of antagonism is not only
260problematic from the standpoint of a pluralist democracy, it is also potentially dangerous. As
261the failure of Third Way and technocratic post-politics shows, the attempt to ban conflict from
262the public sphere gives rise to more intensely antagonistic and even violent forms of conflict
263(such as terrorism, right-wing populism and riots) (Mouffe 2005, pp. 21, 64–89). In contrast,
264what a good agonistic democracy should do is to provide an outlet for conflicts and passions
265(Mouffe 1993, pp. 5–6). It should sublimate—as opposed to disavow or suppress—the
266antagonistic dimension (Mouffe 2000, p. 107n131). The crucial point that both the normative
267theory of liberalism and technocratic post-politics miss is that a certain kind of conflict plays an
268integrative role in modern democracy (ibid., p. 113).
269In order to understand this argument, we have to investigate the Schmittian concept of
270antagonism anew. Until now, we have mainly demonstrated that Mouffe sees value in the
271concept of antagonism and its emphasis on collective identification and political decision.
272However, following Schmitt, she also sees danger in antagonism: ‘he was no doubt right,’ she
273writes, ‘to warn against the dangers that an antagonistic pluralism entails for the permanence of
274the political entity’ (2005, p. 16). As Mark Wenman notes, Schmitt does not only argue that
275antagonism is constitutive of the nature of the political, but also that it poses a security threat
276and therefore has no place within the political association (2013a, p. 193; 2013b, p. 94). One
277reason for the exclusion of intra-associational antagonism is its incompatibility with the
278authority of the state. For Schmitt, there cannot be an antagonistic pluralism concerning the
279principles of legitimacy ‘without the political reality of the state automatically disappearing’
280(Mouffe 1993, p. 131). A second reason, as Johanna Oksala clarifies, is that the friend-enemy
281distinction refers to the ‘the real possibility of physical killing’ (Schmitt cited in Oksala 2012,
282p. 60). As antagonism includes the risk of violence, it also has to be expelled from the political
283association because it ‘would lead to a civil war’ (Decreus and Lievens 2011, p. 683).
284It is at this point, however, that Schmitt and Mouffe go their separate ways. While both
285acknowledge the antagonistic dimension of politics, the latter decides that democratic plural-
286ism and the acknowledgment of antagonism are not irreconcilable. Schmitt’s solution to the
287danger of antagonism is to expel antagonism outside the demos. It is through a displacement of
288antagonism onto the international political sphere that the unity of the people and the stability
289of the political association is safeguarded (Mouffe 2000, p. 54). In contrast, an agonistic
290democracy allows for division and pluralism within the political community. The reason it is
291able to do so is that conflict in a parliamentary system is able to sublimate antagonism.
292Referring to Elias Cannetti’s analysis of the parliamentary system, Mouffe notes how it ‘uses
293the psychological structure of opposing armies and stages a form of warfare which has
294renounced killing’ (2005, p. 22).
295Here, Ben Cross argues, Mouffe defends the theory of agonistic democracy against both
296liberal normativism and Schmitt on political realist grounds. What makes this form of
297democracy superior is that it is able to sublimate the antagonistic dimension and is thus more
298stable than both. Against her liberal opponents, she argues that a rational consensus can never
299safeguard the stability of a modern democracy. By relegating passionate attachments to the
300private sphere and suppressing conflict, they end up creating problems that are far worse—
301such as far-right populism or religious terrorism. Against her other intellectual opponent—
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302Schmitt—she argues that by insulating the political community from internal conflicts, you
303create a breeding ground for destabilising forms of partisanism. One can only stabilise a
304democracy by turning democratic institutions into an outlet for political conflicts and thus by
305making them into apparatuses for transforming antagonistic conflicts into agonist ones (Cross
3062017, pp. 182–185; see also Mouffe 2005, pp. 22–23).
307The Ambiguity of Agonistic Democracy and the Problem of the Rioter
308This solution, however, is not without its problems. After all, not all forms of antagonism can
309be sublimated in an agonistic democracy. Mouffe admits as much: there are certain antago-
310nistic actors, she writes, that cannot find a place in an agonistic democracy. ‘Some demands,’
311she explains, ‘are excluded not because they are declared to be ‘evil’, but because they
312challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association’ (2005, pp.
313120–121). With these actors, then, we remain in a relation of antagonism.
314Again, this requires explanation. For an agonistic democracy to function, there has to be
315some kind of ‘conflictual consensus’. There has to be a ‘common symbolic space among
316opponents who are considered as “legitimate enemies”’ (ibid., p. 52). A political position is
317compatible with this conflictual consensus as long as it meets a substantial and a formal
318criterion. The substantial criterion is an ‘adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal
319democracy’. Democratic citizens must accept both the equality and liberty of all (e.g. accepting
320that all citizens regardless of gender, race or class has a right to political participation). The
321formal criterion is that we treat political actors that also adhere to these principles but defend
322another interpretation as ‘adversaries’. An adversary, Mouffe clarifies, is ‘somebody whose
323ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question’ (Mouffe
3242000, p. 102; see also Rummens 2009, pp. 377–391).
325In accordance with this scheme, two kinds of political actors should be treated as antago-
326nists. On the one hand, there are those political actors that fail to meet the substantial criterion.
327Examples are Islamist extremists or neo-fascists. Positions that, say, fail to acknowledge the
328liberty and equality of women are unacceptable in an agonistic democracy. Therefore, we
329remain antagonistic towards those actors that stubbornly hold onto anti-democratic demands
330(Mouffe 2013, pp. 13–15).
331On the other hand, there are actors who might meet the substantial criterion—and
332thus make democratic demands—but do not meet the formal criterion because their
333actions are not agonistic (Oksala 2012, p. 64). This criterion, I would argue, is vague
334and therefore potentially problematic. As long as we assume that political actors who
335fail this criterion also fail the former one, this stance remains intuitive. It is not very
336difficult to see why violent neo-fascist groupings should be excluded from the
337democratic space. However, the question becomes more difficult once we introduce
338the possibility that democratic demands are made in ways that are not strictly
339speaking agonistic because they are violent or coerce, discipline or punish political
340opponents (Breen 2009, p. 140; Oksala, ibid.; Olson 2009, pp. 87–90). Recent
341research on radical and uncivil disobedience reveals how citizens have opposed
342oppression in uncivil ways throughout the history of modern democracy and still do
343so to this day. Principled disobedience as resistance against oppression, Candice
344Delmas argues, is not always peaceful: militant suffragettes smashed windows and
345heckled opponents, rioters destroy(ed) property and confront(ed) the police, and
346strikers deploy(ed) force against strike-breakers (2018, pp. 38, 45, 65–66).
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347Confronted with this question we start to see the tensions in Mouffe’s thinking. As we
348demonstrated earlier (in the “Laclau and Mouffe: Antagonism, Hegemony and Radical Democ-
349racy” and “Mouffe and the Critique of Normative Liberalism I: Agonistic Democracy and
350Radical Pluralism” sections), she is acutely aware of phenomena like power, exclusion and
351domination. Moreover, she recognises the need to contest relations of domination and ‘to
352problematize the constitution and shape of [the] common political space’ (Norval 2007, p.
353159), if not as an agonistic democrat, at the least as a radical democrat. However, at the same
354time she struggles with her Schmittian heritage (see the “Mouffe and the Critique of Liberalism II:
355Agonistic Democracy and the Sublimation of Antagonism” section). As some critics note, her
356agonistic solution to the Schmittian problem of intra-associational antagonism cannot entirely
357escape its conservative framing (Oksala 2012; Sommerer 2018; Wenman 2013a, pp. 197–201;
3582013b). There aremany times thatMouffe uncritically accepts Schmitt’s linking of the problem of
359antagonism, on the one hand, and the danger presented by the human inclination towards violence
360and aggression, on the other (Mouffe 1993, p. 6; 2000, p. 131; 2005, pp. 3, 25–26; 2013, pp. 4,
36147). The reason that this framing is conservative is that it accepts the human propensity for
362violence as a given against which a certain form of political order has to protect us. And it is this
363framing that compels Mouffe to describe ‘[p]olitics, as the attempt to domesticate the political, to
364keep at bay the force of destruction and to establish order’ (1993, p. 141) and leads her to be wary
365of more intense forms of resistance that ‘tear up the basis of civility’ (2000, p. 104).
366I would like to argue that nowhere is this tension more visible than in her treatment of riots.
367At different points, Mouffe gives some version of her argument that riots are ‘a sheer
368expression of blind violence without any specific claims’ that are the result of a lack of
369political fora in which dissent can be expressed (Decreus and Lievens 2011, p. 698; Hansen
370and Sonnichsen 2014, p. 104; Mouffe 2013, p. 12). The aforementioned tension is visible in
371the following way: on the one hand, and in line with her critique of exclusion, Mouffe refrains
372from blaming the rioters. After all, the crisis of democratic representation is to blame. Yet, in
373line with her concern with the sublimation of antagonism, she is unwilling to grant the riot a
374democratic role given the dangers its violent and antagonistic character presents.
375However, as different political thinkers have already indicated, riots might look like they have
376no positive political or democratic content, yet some of them do (Badiou 2012; Clover 2016;
377Dikeç 2017; Kaulingfreks 2016). Mustafa Dikeç who investigates riots in different democratic
378countries writes the following: riots ‘are neither preconceived nor organised, and they are not
379articulated as collective efforts aimed at transforming the established order’ (2004, p. 191
380emphasis mine). In this respect, the riot cannot be seen as an organised justice movement.
381However, Dikeç emphasises that we can neither consider these riots in isolation from democratic
382demands. In the West, riots are often a reaction to a situation of injustice (ibid.). They often arise
383in situations where there is some sort of exclusion (in the form of concentrated poverty, police
384violence, discrimination or segregation) (Dikeç 2017, p. 6). Hence, the fact that these riots are
385seen as apolitical is often a result of the way in which the state frames them rather than any
386intrinsic characteristic (Dikeç 2004, pp. 192–200). Of course, the violence that explodes in the
387form of riots is not necessarily emancipatory or democratic (ibid., 2017, p. 174). Riots are
388ambiguous, Stephen D’Arcy argues, which makes it important to distinguish the different forms
389that they take. Some of these are unjustifiable: authoritarian riots, for instance, reinforce relations
390of domination (e.g. Kristallnacht or the 1919 Chicago race riots). Recreative riots (e.g. hooligan-
391ism) are also hard to justify (D’Arcy 2014, pp. 131–132; see also Kirkpatrick 2008). The
392‘grievance riot’, however, can be seen as emancipatory: such a riot contests a relation of
393subordination (e.g. police violence, structural unemployment or racism) (ibid.).
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394One could respond that citizens have other, non-violent means of contestation at their
395disposal such as engagement in the public sphere, protests or civil disobedience. But this
396overlooks the fact, Candice Delmas notes, that rioters use violence precisely because ‘they are
397not allowed to participate on civil terms’ (2018, p. 65). Moreover, political riots are at times
398simply more successful than civil protest ‘in projecting the seriousness of the problem, in part
399by threatening further disruption’ (ibid., pp. 65–66). Indeed, as recent research shows, the riot
400is a form of political disobedience with a specific strategic rationale. Rioters erect blockades in
401order to disrupt economic circulation (Clover 2016); they threaten ‘the state with a breakdown
402of its claim to authority [and thus create] a strong incentive to listen to what the unheard have
403to say’ (D’Arcy 2014, pp. 133–137); and communicate and express anger at the persistence of
404injustice, exclusion and subordination (Delmas 2018, p. 65; Pasternak 2019, p. 391).
405This raises the question whether we can accept the democratising potential of riots without
406giving short shrift to Mouffe’s concerns with the dangers of violence and antagonism. This is
407material for the following section: here, I will argue that we can find supplementary concepts
408that allow us to bridge these concerns in the thought of Étienne Balibar.
409Étienne Balibar: Civilising the Insurrection
410Conflict and Normativity: the Many Faces of ‘Equaliberty’
411Although an extensive discussion of Balibar’s project is beyond the scope of this article, it is
412important to show how he envisions the connection between conflict and the democratisation of
413citizenship. In the first place, we should note that Balibar’s thought has a great deal in common
414with Mouffe’s. Both recognise the importance of conflict in a democracy, position themselves as
415adherents of the unfinished project of political modernity and try to balance the critique and
416upholding of political universalism. In addition, they can be identified as radical democrats that
417initially developed their theories from within the Marxist tradition (see Ingram 2015).
418Nonetheless, there are also important differences. Balibar does not wield an abstract theory
419of ‘the political’: he assumes that politics has many different faces. In his Three Concepts of
420Politics, he discerns at least three concepts of politics. This position entails that, in contrast to
421liberals, he refuses to reduce politics to a discussion of rights and, in contrast to Marxists, he
422refuses to reduce it to class struggle. Politics concerns both classically liberal themes like
423juridical freedom and equality, and the material conditions in which the concrete realisation
424and deepening of these values is possible (Balibar 2002, pp. 1–39; Balibar and Wallerstein
4251991, p. 3). In addition, this stance entails, as I will show further on, a greater openness to the
426diversity of political strategies. Where Mouffe reduces democratic politics to a certain version
427of the agonistic conflict, Balibar argues that emancipatory politics calls for a mixture of
428political forms (Balibar 2015a, pp. 106–107).
429Why will democratic citizenship remain illusory without conflict? At the onset of the
430French Revolution, Balibar argues, an ideal was called into life that forms the kernel of
431democratic citizenship. This ideal he calls ‘the proposition of equaliberty’ (la proposition de
432l’égaliberté). This rather awkward play on words allows him to question the artificiality of an
433often-made distinction: the assumption that liberty as a liberal value is opposed to equality as a
434socialist value. Freedom without equality, Balibar contends, is an illusion and vice versa.
435Specifically, this means that ‘[…] the (de facto) historical conditions of freedom are exactly the
436same as the (de facto) historical conditions of equality’ (2014, p. 48). Equaliberty dictates that
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437every single situation in which the freedom or equality of citizens are suppressed is unaccept-
438able. More precisely, ‘there is no example of conditions that suppress or repress freedom that
439do not suppress or limit—that is, do not abolish—equality, and vice versa’ (ibid., p. 49).
440However, the implications of this proposition are far-reaching. That is why Balibar proposes a
441subtle, but significant nuance: equaliberty is a negative universal. Each attempt to give a
442concrete, institutional form to this ideal will fall short of it. Consequently, modern citizens will
443have to recover this ideal again and again (ibid., p. 50).
444In turn, this explains the importance of conflict. If not a single historical form of democratic
445citizenship is able to live up to the ideal of equaliberty, this entails that democratic citizenship
446is always built on forms of exclusion and domination. That is why citizens have to recover this
447ideal from time to time—confronting the forms of exclusion and domination on which their
448citizenship is built. However, those citizens that have a strong interest in maintaining these
449forms of oppression, exclusion and inequality, will do so. There is no such thing, Balibar
450argues, as a natural disposition to keep up and preserve equaliberty: ‘[t]he dominant never give
451up their privileges or their power voluntarily’ (ibid., p. 5). Political conflict is therefore that
452which makes the further extension of this ideal possible. Conflict enables us to open up
453democratic citizenship to those that are excluded from it, to implement it beyond the nation
454state and extend it to formerly ‘apolitical’ domains of society (Balibar 2014, p. 157). As this
455task will forever remain unfinished, conflict will always be necessary to drive forward the
456democratization of citizenship.
457The Politics of Civility
458However, this conflictual democratic citizenship has a certain relation to danger. Specifically: ‘In
459order to save themselves or remain alive as a community of citizens, the city must run the risk of
460destruction or anarchy’ (ibid., p. 284). If we want to fulfil the promise of democratic citizenship,
461we have to jeopardise our peaceful co-existence from time to time (Balibar 2005, p. 127).
462Nonetheless, this does not mean that we can reproach Balibar for being reckless. He is
463acutely aware of the dangers that accompany political conflict. There is, as he notes, a tragic
464aspect to his views on politics. We should hold up the promise of democratic citizenship, and
465this entails transforming the status quo and the forms of structural violence that characterise it.
466Yet, at the same time, the emancipatory struggle can produce forms of violence of its own that
467threaten to undermine it (Balibar 2009b, p. 10).
468This is an idea that Balibar develops in his critical study of the Marxist tradition. One of the
469paradoxes of Marxism is that, on the one hand, it gives us a fresh perspective on the relation
470between economic structures and violence and, on the other hand, has a distorted vision on the
471relation between emancipatory politics and violence (Balibar 2010, p. 251). The dominant
472tendency in the Marxist tradition, Balibar argues, accepts the illusion of a ‘counterviolence’.
473This is the idea that revolutionary violence can avoid reproducing aspects of the structural
474violence it opposes. The illusion consists in the idea that an emancipatory insurrection can
475bring about emancipation by violently eliminating the oppressing class and its apparatuses of
476violence, without itself succumbing to (and therefore reproducing) the violence that it employs
477(Balibar 2015b, pp. 6–7). For example, we find this idea in Marx’s statement that ‘force
478[Gewalt] is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one’ (1976 [1867],
479p. 916). The intuition implicit in this statement is that the destruction, violence and suffering
480that accompany revolutionary change can be neatly transformed into emancipation, progress
481and a society free from violence (Balibar 2015b, pp. 6–9). To reiterate, politics, and certainly
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482emancipatory politics, is tragic. On the one hand, the status quo is never acceptable. But on the
483other hand, political change risks producing forms of violence that have a cruel character. In
484such cases, politics is made impossible as the shared political space collapses under the weight
485of hostilities (Balibar 2009a, p. 62).
486This last idea has to be specified as it brings Balibar closer to a problematic central to
487Mouffe’s philosophy: it shows that he acknowledges that a conflict can become so intense that
488politics—also insurgent politics—is made impossible. In doing so, he introduces the
489(corresponding) concepts ‘cruelty’ and ‘extreme violence’. Cruelty is a specific type of
490violence that is both inextricable from politics (political action always risks producing cruelty)
491and a limit to politics (once it is produced, it eliminates the conditions of possibility of politics).
492To specify the latter, cruelty is a limit to politics because it is incontrovertible. This means that
493cruelty can never lead to progress or lead to constructive change. This extreme violence is
494incontrovertible, Balibar further specifies, because it eliminates the ‘human in man’ (2015b, p.
49552). For the victims of extreme violence ‘it is virtually impossible […] to imagine or present
496themselves in person as political subjects capable of humanity by emancipating themselves’
497(ibid., p. 57). It is a form of violence that is so unbearable to its victims that it affects their
498capacity for political action. In turn, examples of cruelty can be found in two forms:
499ultraobjective and ultrasubjective ones. The first are forms of structural violence that produce
500‘disposable human beings’. If people are forced to live on the streets or populations are
501deprived of vital medications purely as a result of an economic logic, we speak of
502ultraobjective cruelty. Ultrasubjective cruelty, on the other hand, is a form of violence that
503pursues the elimination of individuals or groups that are seen as the incarnation of evil (ibid., p.
50452–53). The Nazi extermination camps and the most extreme stages of civil wars provide
505examples of such a violence.
506What makes Balibar’s introduction of the concept of cruelty interesting is that it introduces
507a conceptual distinction within the concept of violence. After all, not all forms of violence
508deserve to be called ‘extreme’ (ibid., p. 21). In this respect, Balibar admits that his thought is
509indebted to Max Weber: it is not impossible that the limited exercise of violence might prevent
510a far worse violence. Yet, this also entails the need to develop a political ethic that is
511appropriate to this tragic (because violent) nature of political action. Political actors must
512cultivate a political sensibility appropriate to a world that often is violent, meaning that they
513have to learn when to avoid violence, but also—if necessary—when to resort to violence
514(Balibar 2009b, pp. 28–29; see also Balibar 2014, p. 284). In this respect, Balibar not only
515provides us with a more complex theory of violence (as opposed to Mouffe’s more monolithic
516approach). But he also has a provisional theory of how to prevent the deterioration of political
517action (including forms of violent political action) into cruelty. This is a second advantage over
518Mouffe’s approach: after all, as we noted above that she has no theory of how to transform
519violent forms of antagonism into forms of agonism, apart, that is, from reiterating that
520antagonistic conflict is less likely to occur as long as there is agonistic conflict.
521This political ethic goes under the name of strategies of civility. Every emancipatory
522politics, Balibar argues, calls for these strategies that aim to reduce the violence bred by
523political change. First, we should note that civility is something that political movements
524impose on themselves. Civility is not something that is enforced by a state that sets limits to
525political conflict (Ingram 2015, pp. 226–227). Moreover, civility ‘does not necessarily involve
526the idea of a suppression of ‘conflicts’ and ‘antagonisms’ in society’ (Balibar 2014, p. 116). It
527is up to political movements themselves to find ways of changing society for the better without
528letting violence get out of hand. This entails that civility operates on different levels. On the
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529one hand, emancipatory movements try to civilise state and economy. Because state and
530economy can sustain forms of cruelty, emancipatory movements have to civilise them from
531the bottom up. This means that these movements force state and market to perceive citizens as
532human beings—not as ‘enemies of the state’ or ‘disposable humans’. On the other hand, these
533movements—and certainly revolutionary ones—owe it to themselves to civilise their revolu-
534tion. After all, this is the only way in which they can keep their resistance alive (Balibar 2015b,
535p. 131). It breaks the mimetic circle in which the resistance against violence and exclusion
536takes on extremely violent forms that undo its effectivity (Balibar 2015a, p. 67). Hence, the
537history of these movements teaches us that not a single strategy is able to balance these
538different tasks. Violent resistance is often not able to temper its excesses and is thus bound to
539succumb to a state whose means of violence always exceeds its own. And non-violent
540strategies do not always succeed in bringing those in power to their knees. This is why a
541mix of strategies—violent and non-violent, strategies aimed at and withdrawn from the state—
542is always necessary (Balibar 2015b, pp. 93–126).
543The Becoming-Insurrectional of the Riot
544In the current section, I will give these foregoing propositions a more concrete form. And to do this,
545we will have to return to the introduction to this article: the French riots and Balibar’s reflections on
546them. Let us reiterate President Nicolas Sarkozy’s reaction: rioters, he said, are criminals and the
547proper political response is the strict enforcement of the public order. Balibar, however, arrives at a
548different conclusion: riots stem from a situation of exclusion and oppression, and therefore, they
549cannot be apolitical.More precisely, although it is an open questionwhether the actions of rioters are
550political, we cannot deny that the riot is a political event (Balibar 2014, p. 234). He characterises the
551situations from which riots arise as states of ‘internal exclusion’. This is a type of exclusion that is
552characterised by the fact that the excluded can neither be wholly accepted by, nor wholly expelled
553from the community of citizens. The form assumed by internal exclusion is hence that of a
554differentiated citizenship. A citizenship, that is, in which access to (and the full exercise of) rights
555is not equally distributed, and structural forms of racism and economic domination reduce certain
556citizens to second-class citizens (ibid., pp. 201–202; 249–250).
557Given these circumstances, the riot can be described as an ‘anti-institutional violence that
558aims to ‘break down the gates’ of the space of citizenship’ (Balibar 2015a, p. 66). This
559violence, however, can be counterproductive. First, it takes place on uneven terrain: rioters
560often can do little to resist the overwhelming power of the state. Second, states often refer to
561the violence of riots to justify their own violence (ibid.). Lastly, it is still an open question as to
562what extent the violence of riots is political. As Balibar writes, one of the first things he noticed
563about the French riots was its partly self-destructive character. Was not it their ‘own’ schools,
564‘own’ community centres and ‘own’ cars that went up in flames (2014, p. 236)?
565However, as opposed to Mouffe, Balibar refuses to give up on the riot. We must try to
566understand, he writes, how politics can emerge from its opposite—anti-politics (ibid., p. 251).
567To put it in differently, how can we politicise the riot which is driven both by political and anti-
568political tendencies? For a start, we cannot deny that there is a certain strength in riots and this
569strength is precisely the force of its negativity—the force of refusal. Because the riot arises
570from forms of injustice and domination that cannot be easily resolved within the existing
571political order, it confronts a society with its shortcomings and blind spots. At the same time,
572its greatest strength is also at once a weakness. The negativity of the riots can also prove to be
573its undoing (ibid., p. 256).
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574This is essentially, I would argue, a question of the proper strategies of civility. After all, it
575requires us to consider how a movement that arises against forms of domination can be kept
576from succumbing to its own violence and the violence of the state. What is striking, then, is
577that Balibar’s recommendations always point in the direction of strategies that, on the one
578hand, are developed from the bottom up and, on the other hand, do not aim to compromise the
579radicalism of the riot. It is not up to the state or political parties to curtail the riot. What must be
580realised is a becoming-political or becoming-insurrectional of the riot. This is the process in
581which the political demands of rioters are echoed by and translated to other revolts (ibid., p.
582255). An arresting example of this process is the emergence of the Black Lives Matter
583movement. On August 9th, 2014, policeman Darren Wilson shot and killed the Afro-
584American teenager Mike Brown in the city of Ferguson. This would prove to be the final
585straw in one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the region. Also here, peaceful protest quickly
586gave way to riots. What makes the uprising interesting, however, is how other political actors
587responded to the riots. What could easily have remained limited to a short outburst of anger
588was—through a diversity of strategies such as direction actions, organisational work and
589occupations—transformed into a mass movement against racism, mass incarceration, poverty
590and police violence. And all of this was done without making concessions to the political order
591(Taylor 2016, pp. 153–190).
592Conclusion
593Rather than summarise the argument, I want to conclude with a reflection on its relevance to
594this special issues’ debate on citizenship in a time of crisis. We argued that the radical
595democratic theories of Mouffe and Balibar exhibit a tension between the desire for a thriving
596democratic conflict and the necessity to circumscribe this conflict. This tension is replicated in
597their respective concepts of citizenship. To start with Mouffe, throughout her oeuvre, she holds
598on to a definition of citizenship that emphasizes active political involvement (and not only
599legal status). In particular, she supports a radical democratic form of citizenship: social agents
600act as citizens if they contest relations of domination by referring to the principles of liberty
601and equality (Mouffe 2018, pp. 47–48). However, she also recognises that this is but one form
602of citizenship: ‘there can be as many forms of citizenship,’ she writes, ‘as there are interpre-
603tations of [the principles of liberal democracy]’ (Mouffe 1993, p. 84). Hence, in order to keep
604the political community from disintegrating, we need an ‘idea of commonality, of an ethico-
605political bond that creates a linkage among participants in the association’ (ibid., p. 66). In
606other words, the radical democratic citizen is caught between two citizen roles: (a) that of the
607radical democratic citizen confronting domination and (b) that of a fellow citizen to others who
608are no radical democrats and might oppose their ideas and actions.
609This involves constraints on the political principles that radical democratic citizens can
610defend and the means that they can use to achieve their goals. The first requirement is no real
611problem as radical democratic citizens enact an immanent critique of liberal democracy—
612mobilising its ideals to contest its failures (Mouffe 2018, p. 33). The means-question, I argued,
613is more tenuous: in the later stages of its development, Mouffe’s democratic theory presup-
614poses the incompatibility of democratic action and violence. This influences her preferred
615choice of political strategy such as her recent defence of a left populism that aims to transform
616the state from within through a non-violent engagement with the institutions of representative
617democracy (Mouffe 2018). It also precludes violent and coercive forms of insurgent
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618democratic action. Violence can constitute a democratic space (in a revolution against a non-
619democratic regime), and it can protect this space against anti-democrats. But once the
620democratic space is constituted, democratic violence is strictly speaking an anomaly. Different
621forms of radical democratic citizenship such as uncivil disobedience, revolts and riots thus
622disappear from view.
623Obviously, whether this is a problem depends on your beliefs concerning the admissibility
624of citizen violence. You may believe that the use of violence is unworthy of a citizen.
625However, I argue that it might be warranted in certain cases such as riots in which second-
626class citizens contest their exclusion. Riots exist at the crossroads of two contemporary but
627opposing movements. They arise in response to an ongoing de-democratisation of citizenship:
628the hollowing out of social citizenship, the racist policing of second-class citizens in the
629banlieues and the crisis of political representation. But riots can also have the effect of
630democratising citizenship as they contest these tendencies and the relations of subordination
631they result in. Under this interpretation, the rioter is an instance of Balibar’s figure of the active
632citizen who ‘openly confront[s] the lack of democracy in existing institutions and transform[s]
633them in a more or less radical manner’ (Balibar 2015a, p. 124). Of course, the riot is a limited
634strategy for the democratisation of citizenship, if only because it is always in danger of
635succumbing to its own violence. But Balibar gives us a glimpse of what it would mean to
636increase—and not restrict or reduce—the radicalness of the riot. Strategies of civility allow us
637to do this by increasing the longevity of these revolts. Confronted with political subjects that
638jeopardise the peacefulness of the community of citizens, we should ask whether their
639resistance has an emancipatory or democratic kernel. Our task is to reinforce it.
640
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